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D

o electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems separately or jointly? We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the number
of electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables (district magnitude and proximity of presidential and legislative elections), one intervening variable (effective number of presidential
candidates), and two new measures of ethnopolitical cleavages based on constructivist specification of
ethnopolitical groups (fragmentation and concentration). Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently
reduces the number of parties but, interactively with ethnopolitical concentration, increases it. However,
the additive and interactive combinations of both measures with electoral institutions explain the largest
amount of variance in the number of parties. These results emphasize the importance of ethnopolitical
cleavages in mediating the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of party systems, with important
implications for the stability of Africa’s emerging democracies in which parties are weak and multiethnic
coalitions are fluid.

o electoral institutions and ethnopolitical
cleavages shape the structure (the fragmentation or concentration) of party systems separately or jointly? If they shape the structure of party
systems jointly, how can this joint effect be theoretically specified and empirically tested? If ethnopolitical
groups and associated ethnopolitical cleavages are not
primordially fixed but constructed in the course of social, economic, and political interactions, as the accumulated findings of over three decades of comparative
research on ethnopolitics attest, how can constructed
ethnopolitical groups be specified and associated eth-
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nopolitical cleavages measured? Do measures of ethnopolitical cleavages premised on constructivist logic
and processes offer better explanations of variations
in the structure of party systems, independently and in
combination with electoral institutions, than measures
based on primordialist logic? What are the implications
of how electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape party systems for the stability of Africa’s
unconsolidated democracies in which political parties
are weak and multiethnic coalitions fluid?
To answer these questions systematically, we utilize
two new data sets on African countries—one on elections and electoral institutions and the other on ethnopolitical groups and cleavages. While empirically focused on Africa, our analysis and data sets are designed
to address three substantive theoretical issues in comparative scholarship that are reflected in the preceding
list of questions. The first issue concerns the competing emphases on electoral institutions and social cleavages as mutually exclusive determinants of the structure of party systems and recent attempts to bridge this
theoretical divide. Arguing for their joint impact, we
employ the notion of embedded institution to clarify
how electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages
structure the strategic coordination of voters and candidates over votes and seats, and we systematically test
for their independent, additive, and interactive effects
on the fragmentation or concentration of party systems
as measured by the number of electoral and legislative parties. The second issue concerns the accumulated
findings in comparative scholarship that ethnic groups,
identities, and cleavages are not primordially fixed, but
are constructed in the course of social, economic, and
political interactions, and the analytical implications of
this constructivist approach for specifying ethnopolitical groups, measuring the cleavages among them, and
incorporating these measures in explaining variations
in the structure of party systems. We reject primordialism and draw on the insights of the constructivist
approach to specify ethnopolitical groups (constructed

379

Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa

and politicized ethnic groups, as discussed below) and
measure the cleavages among and within them. Our
data analysis shows that these specifications and measures provide improved accounts of variations in the
number of electoral and legislative parties. The third
issue concerns the prospects for stability of unconsolidated emerging democracies. We proceed by clarifying
the first two issues, followed by a description of our
research design and the presentation of data analysis.
In the conclusion, we speculate on how our analysis
helps to clarify the third issue.

INSTITUTIONS, CLEAVAGES, AND PARTY
SYSTEMS
An important debate in the comparative literature on
parties and party systems involves the competing emphasis on electoral institutions (Duverger 1962) and
social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) as mutually
exclusive determinants of the structure of party systems. But scholars also recognize that social cleavages
condition institutional effects. Thus, plurality formulas that typically produce two-party systems also tend
to foster multiparty systems if voters are regionally
concentrated and vote as a block, as, for example, in
India and Canada (Rae 1971). And proportional formulas predictably tend to increase the number of parties but only in ethnically heterogeneous societies and
not in ethnically homogeneous ones (Ordeshook and
Shvetsova 1994). These emendations suggest the possibility of a joint impact of electoral institutions and social
cleavages on the structure of party system. In particular,
they underscore the importance of two dimensions of
ethnopolitical cleavages in mediating the direct effects
of electoral institutions: ethnopolitical fragmentation
and ethnopolitical concentration. We present quantitative measures of both dimensions and test their independent as well as additive and interactive effects
with each other and with electoral institutions on the
number of electoral and legislative parties in Africa’s
emerging democracies.

Embedded Institutions
Systematically sorting out the independent and joint
effects of institutions and cleavages on party systems requires a theoretical specification of these relationships
that denies a priori privilege to either institutions or
cleavages. The notion of “embedded institutions” provides this specification. It conceptualizes electoral institutions as embedded in wider social contexts, raising
the possibility that similar institutions may not produce
similar outcomes in different contexts and leaving the
validation or rejection of that possibility to empirical
investigation (Grofman et al. 1999).
The notion of embedded institution highlights
how electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages
shape party systems. Electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape party systems as sources of
information that structure the mutual expectations of
voters and candidates about winning and losing, thus
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facilitating their strategic coordination over votes and
seats. However, the information that the two variables
contain and convey may not necessarily be consistent;
indeed, they may be at odds with each other. This may
explain why electoral institutions do not always produce their expected results in many new democracies
(Moser 2001; Mozaffar 1997). That expected institutional outcomes do not obtain, however, is often interpreted as an indication of the failure of electoral
institutions to perform in expected ways. An alternative, but related, explanation is that contextual variables provide more relevant information for voters and
candidates that modifies the impact of electoral institutions. It is a useful research strategy, therefore, to
sort out this relationship of structured tension between
electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages by
specifying and examining their independent, additive,
and interactive effects on the structure of party systems.

Strategic Coordination
The strategic coordination role of electoral institutions
is now well established (see, e.g., Cox 1997; Lijphart
1994; Sartori 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Cox’s
(1997) definitive work clarifies the central logic: (a)
candidates wish to get elected and voters wish to gain
the benefits of voting for winners, and (b) candidates’
and voters’ expectations of winning and losing tend to
be mutually reinforcing. Electoral institutions structure
these two micro-level processes, which, in turn, affect
the number of electoral and legislative parties. The
role of electoral institutions in strategic coordination
is premised on political actors’ knowledge and understanding of the information embodied in these institutions. In emerging democracies, however, electoral
institutions are new and their incentives and outcomes
not well known or understood by political actors, who
compensate for the resulting information deficit by relying on alternative sources of information and coordination. In Africa, ethnopolitical groups and cleavages
are these alternative sources.
Ethnopolitical groups facilitate strategic coordination because the identities that define them are strategic
resources that are contingently (not reflexively) activated to define group interests and that help to reduce
the cost of collective political action in response to the
institutional incentives that structure the competition
for power and resources. In Africa, colonial institutions
established the initial institutional incentives for constructing and politicizing ethnic groups and identities,
while varied postcolonial regimes reinforced the incentives for sustaining and occasionally redefining these
groups and identities, as discussed in the next section
(Laitin 1986; Rothchild 1997).
How ethnopolitical cleavages facilitate strategic coordination among voters and candidates to shape the
structure of party systems depends largely on patterns
of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration. Analysts generally posit an isomorphic relationship between ethnopolitical cleavages and party systems on
the assumption that each ethnopolitical group involved
in a cleavage is totally separate from others and is also
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sufficiently large and internally cohesive to support a
party by itself. Thus, ceteris paribus, large numbers of
cleavages (high ethnopolitical fragmentation) increase
and small numbers of cleavages (low ethnopolitical
fragmentation) reduce the number of parties. However, the nature of constructed ethnopolitical groups
in Africa and the resulting cleavages that we describe
below reveal a complex group morphology that seriously militates against such a reflexive relationship between ethnopolitical cleavages and party system structure. Specifically, African ethnopolitical demography
features politically salient differences within as well as
among groups. The resulting high ethnopolitical fragmentation, ceteris paribus, either produces such a high
degree of vote dispersion among large numbers of small
parties that most are unlikely to secure enough votes
to win seats or produces small numbers of large multiethnic parties by encouraging them to campaign for
votes across both intergroup and intragroup cleavages.
Either way, high ethnopolitical fragmentation is likely
to reduce the number of parties.
African ethnopolitical groups, however, also exhibit the highest levels of geographic concentration
in the world (Gurr 1993). Such concentrations, especially when they exist “in above-plurality proportions
in particular constituencies and geographical pockets”
(Sartori 1994, 40), help to counteract the reductive effect of ethnopolitical fragmentation on the number of
parties. Geographic concentration by itself, however,
is unlikely to overcome the reductive effect of high
fragmentation due to the presence of large numbers of
small ethnopolitical groups. Countries with low fragmentation, moreover, feature a small number of large
ethnopolitical groups that are also likely to have dispersed populations and, therefore, do not need concentrated voters to sustain a small number of parties.
These variations in the configurations of ethnopolitical
cleavages suggest the likelihood of an interactive effect
of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration on
the structure of party systems.
The magnitude of this effect will depend on the district magnitude, that is, the number of seats in each
electoral district. District magnitude shapes party systems by setting a minimum threshold of votes required
to win one seat (or, conversely, the maximum number
of votes a party can secure without winning a seat) and
thus influencing the proportionality between votes and
seats. Ceteris paribus, small districts set high thresholds that increase vote-seat disproportionality and reduce the number of parties, while large districts set low
thresholds that reduce vote-seat disproportionality and
increase the number of parties.
Presidential elections also play a crucial role in shaping the structure of party systems (Cox 1997, 187–90,
203–21; Jones 1995; Shugart and Carey 1992). This has
special resonance in Africa, where all new democracies,
except Lesotho and South Africa, have adopted presidential systems. Presidential elections in Africa are important for three reasons. First, with the presidency as
the top prize in the political game, presidential elections
attract a large number of candidates, few of whom have
any realistic chance of winning. Characteristic prob-
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lems of postauthoritarian democracies—limited experience with competitive elections, information deficit
about the extent of electoral support, plus personal
ambition—prevent opposition candidates from coordinating on a single candidate to oppose incumbents
armed with the standard advantages of incumbency.
Second, an important strategic reason for the entry
of large numbers of contenders in presidential elections is that African presidents possess substantial resources for patronage. Presidential contenders with
weak winning potential often expect to demonstrate
sufficient electoral support to bargain entry into postelection coalitions and secure state resources for their
constituencies in return for political support of the
winners. Third, for leading presidential candidates the
electoral base and bargaining resources possessed by
weaker candidates are also strategically important because of the salience of ethnopolitical groups for electoral support. Just as it constrains legislative candidates, the combination of ethnopolitical fragmentation
and concentration may also constrain leading presidential candidates from securing outright electoral majorities. And since the weaker candidates often control
small but cohesive blocks of votes, leading presidential
contenders have strong incentives to form minimumwinning coalitions with them to ensure an electoral
victory and a governing majority.
The extent to which strong and weak presidential
contenders are able to negotiate minimum-winning
coalitions will depend, among other things, on the proximity of presidential and legislative elections and the
number of presidential candidates (Cox 1997, 209–
13). Greater proximity of presidential and legislative
elections tends to reduce the number of parties due
to the coattail effects of winning presidential candidates. Large numbers of presidential candidates have
the opposite effect due to the influence of ethnopolitical
cleavages.
In addressing these substantive theoretical concerns,
our analysis builds on the only two studies, of which we
are aware, that also test for the independent, additive,
and interactive effects of electoral institutions and ethnic heterogeneity on the number of electoral (Cox 1997,
esp. 203–21) and legislative (Ordeshook and Shvetsova
1994) parties.1 But our analysis also extends their theoretical insights in two specific ways. First, the two studies
measure ethnic heterogeneity by a fractionalization index that is based on primordialist specification of ethnic
groups and, therefore, can neither distinguish politically relevant ethnic groups from irrelevant ones nor
capture politically salient intragroup differences. We
focus only on ethnopolitical groups, that is, on politically
relevant ethnic groups specified by the logic of constructivism. Our measures of ethnopolitical cleavages,
therefore, capture multiple levels of politically salient
cleavages consistent with the complex morphology of
ethnopolitical groups in African countries. Second, the
two studies focus only on ethnic fragmentation, while
1

Powell (1982) also focused on the joint effects of electoral institutions and social heterogeneity but examined only their additive
effects on the number of legislative parties.
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we focus on ethnopolitical concentration as well as ethnopolitical fragmentation.

SPECIFYING CONSTRUCTED
ETHNOPOLITICAL GROUPS AND
CLEAVAGES2
The logic of constructivism turns on the notion that
individuals have multiple ethnic identities that are constructed in the course of social, economic, and political interactions. This malleability of ethnic identities
derives (a) from the multiplicity of objective ethnic
markers (language, religion, race, caste, “tribe,” territory, etc.) that may be invoked to define and distinguish
ethnic groups, (b) from the relative complexity of these
markers that may foster intragroup divisions combined
with intergroup differences (e.g., sectarian divisions
in a religion, “tribal” differences among same language speakers, or subjects of the same kingdom), and
(c) from temporal changes in the relevance of these
composite markers and their components in defining
and distinguishing ethnic groups as well as in the politicization of resulting intergroup and intragroup cleavages
(Chandra 2001, 7–8; Laitin and Posner 2001, 13–16).
Intrinsic to the logic of constructivism are three specific processes that motivate our criteria for specifying the ethnopolitical groups and the cleavages among
them that we include in our analysis: construction,
politicization, and particization. We do not explicate
the construction of ethnic groups and cleavages, but we
do highlight its salient features because it is a necessary
precondition for the politicization of ethnic groups, that
is, the construction of ethnic groups into ethnopolitical
groups. Like other social cleavages, however, not all
ethnic cleavages become politicized, and even fewer
become “particized, that is, made into important lines
of partisan division” (Cox 1997, 26, original emphasis).
We describe below how this crucial distinction between
particization and other forms of politicization of ethnic
cleavages helps to solve the problem of endogeneity
that is ostensibly inherent in measuring ethnopolitical
cleavages for explaining variations in the number of
electoral and legislative parties.
An ethnic group is constructed when individuals in
culturally plural societies self-consciously choose one
or more objective ethnic markers to distinguish ingroups from out-groups. In Africa, as elsewhere, the individuals’ choice of ethnic markers and the consequent
size of the constructed ethnic groups are constrained by
the variety, complexity, and prior use of such markers,
the associated cost of forming new groups and sustaining group solidarity, and the institutional framework
of governance defined by the state. Increased variety
and complexity of ethnic markers expand opportunities for ethnic group construction but also constrain
unfettered construction of especially large and cohesive ethnic groups because of (a) the high start-up cost
of group formation associated with the incorporation
2 This section draws on materials and data presented in Scarritt and
Mozaffar 1999.
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of competing groups and interests defined by varied
ethnic makers to construct larger and more encompassing ethnic groups and (b) the high cost of sustaining group solidarity in the face of the varied markers
serving as competing sources of group definition within
the larger constructed agglomerations. These structural
and strategic factors thus limit the size and the cohesion
of ethnic groups that can be constructed and mobilized
for collective political action.
In Africa, colonial rule and postcolonial regimes reinforced these constraints by structuring the variety and
complexity of ethnic markers and politicizing some of
them. Colonial rulers’ reliance on local agents to cope
with the dilemma of maintaining control at low cost
encouraged these agents to differentiate their groups
from those not so privileged by colonial authority either
by recombining and redefining existing objective markers of ethnicity or by accentuating previously minor
group differences (Vail 1989). Colonial rulers’ creation
of administrative units to secure additional economies
in the cost of governance incorporated culturally disparate groups within single administrative units or separated culturally similar groups into separate units.
Occasionally, administrative encapsulation enabled the
combination and redefinition of different ethnic markers for the construction of larger, territorially concentrated and, hence, also cohesive ethnopolitical groups.
In other instances, colonial rulers privileged one ethnic
marker (e.g., ancestral village) to foster spatially distributed, hence fragmented, groups over another (e.g.,
religion) that could foster larger and more encompassing groups (Laitin 1986). In these different ways, colonial rule emphasized the relevance of a wide range
of diffuse and heterogeneous criteria of group formation, thereby increasing instead of decreasing the variety and complexity of objective ethnic markers that
constrained the construction and politicization of large
and cohesive ethnic groups in Africa’s culturally plural
societies.
At independence, therefore, African countries inherited a distinctive ethnic morphology with three defining features that are reflected in the structure of constructed ethnopolitical groups and that have shaped
the pattern of their political interactions: (1) marked
differences in group size, such that virtually no major
ethnopolitical group comprises an outright majority
in a country, although some comprise a large plurality; (2) considerable variety and complexity in ethnic
markers, such that, even as they produce politically
salient interethnic differences, they also produce politically salient intragroup heterogeneity but limited cultural differences among large agglomerations of such
groups; and (3) the territorial concentration of some
ethnic groups that facilitates their construction as large
and cohesive units for collective political action. These
three features have combined with the accommodation by postcolonial regimes of instrumental (“porkbarrel”) ethnopolitical demands to foster communal
contention as the typical pattern of political interactions
in which ethnopolitical groups serve as cost-effective
strategic resource for organizing political competition for power and resources. Communal contention,
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however, underscores the high start-up cost of new
group formation and the high maintenance cost
of group solidarity, thus discouraging political entrepreneurs from exaggerating cultural differences
among groups and encouraging them instead to maintain strong group identities, including some coexisting
subgroup identities, that are strategically sustained by
their ability to access the state and secure valued goods
and services for their followers (Mozaffar and Scarritt
1999, 239–42).
The constructivist processes highlighted above motivate five criteria for specifying ethnopolitical groups
and cleavages. The first, which derives from the distinction among the construction, politicization, and particization of ethnic groups and helps to avoid the endogeneity problem noted above, involves specifying only
those groups that have demonstrated their actual political relevance or high potential political relevance
based on past relevance, apart from or prior to particization. We thus employ the decision rule that the
incidence of at least one of the following several forms
of long-standing politicization other than particization
is a necessary and sufficient indicator of the construction of ethnopolitical groups: (a) organized group mobilization unrelated to party formation (primarily in
ethnic associations or cliques of leaders within the same
party, the bureaucracy, or the military); (b) articulation
of grievances by leaders claiming to speak for a group
rather than a party; (c) participation in collective action
or (violent or nonviolent) conflict with other groups
or the state and being subjected to state violence;
(d) encapsulation within or domination of an officially
designated administrative unit; (e) occupying a disproportionate number of high positions in the bureaucracy
or the military; and (f) controlling disproportionate socioeconomic resources.
The second criterion involves specifying all ethnopolitical groups, even at the risk of being overly inclusive.
Thus our decision rule deliberately defines forms of
nonparty politicization broadly. Furthermore, we draw
on the extensive secondary Africanist literature in history, anthropology, sociology, and political science to
assess the demonstrated and potential political relevance of a wide range of ethnic groups to arrive at
the list of ethnopolitical groups included in our data
set.3 The third criterion involves specifying ethnopolitical groups at three levels of inclusiveness in order
to capture all cleavages that may affect variations in
party system structure, including national dichotomous
cleavages between top-level groups (which are found in
twelve countries), as well as a variety of more complex
multiethnic ones usually involving both middle-level
groups (within or independent of top level groups) and
lower-level groups within them. The fourth criterion involves specifying the geographic concentration of ethnopolitical groups and subgroups. As noted above, territorial concentration facilitates ethnopolitical group
3

We acknowledge that in the case of ambiguity in the secondary
literature, we relied on our best judgments based on our knowledge
and expertise to assess demonstrated political relevance of specified
groups.
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construction by furnishing a critical mass of individuals
with similar interests based on common location, thus
reducing the start-up cost of group formation and the
maintenance cost of group solidarity. The final criterion
concerns specifying the time frame for the cleavages
that we analyze. Thus, to be included in our data set,
ethnic groups at all levels of inclusiveness must have
been politicized at least 10 years prior to the first election analyzed in each country, which helps to avoid the
problem of endogeneity, and the most recent evidence
of their politicization must be no more than 20 years
prior to this election, which helps to establish their
continued, and potential for future, politicization.4
Based on these five criteria, we specified 242 ethnopolitical groups and subgroups at three levels of inclusiveness in 34 countries that held multiparty elections
between 1980 and 2000. These countries and elections
are the focus of our analysis, and the 242 groups are the
basis of our two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages,
fragmentation and concentration. Ethnic groups that
did not meet one or more of the necessary and sufficient conditions for politicization specified above, or
are subgroups of our lower-level groups, are excluded
from the analysis (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999, 88–91).

MEASURES, METHODS, AND MODELS
Variable Operationalizations
Party Systems. The structure of the party system measured by the number of electoral and the number of
legislative parties is the dependent variable in our analysis. We employ the widely used indices developed by
Laakso and Taagepera (1989) to operationalize both
measures: Effective Number of Electoral Parties and
Effective Number of Legislative Parties.
Electoral Institutions. District Magnitude is now
widely acknowledged as the decisive institutional variable in shaping the structure of party systems. Because
countries with proportional representation formulas
for converting votes into seats have multiple districts
of varying size, we follow Lijphart (1994) and utilize
average district magnitude as the summary measure for
district magnitude. Also, because of the potential curvilinear relationship between district magnitude and the
number of parties (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994,
106–7), we utilize the natural log of district magnitude.5

4

We made an exception to the 10-year rule for inclusion in the case
of politicization of groups through violence because this is so clearly
independent of particization. For example, ethnic associations that
were instrumental in politicizing the Yorubas and the lbos in Nigeria
were founded in the 1920s and 1930s and have continued to be active
within the last 20 years, while the politicization of the Ogoni and
other “oil minorities” in that country occurred only a little more than
10 years prior to the 1999 election and involved considerable violence.
This criterion means that politicized groups remain constant for all
of the elections analyzed in this article, although their particization
may change between elections. The analysis of future elections may
require that changes in politicization be taken into account.
5 For other measures of district magnitude, see Taagepera and
Shugart 1989, 126–41, 264–69.
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Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections is
also an important institutional variable that shapes the
structure of party systems. We utilize Cox’s (1997, 209–
13) formula to operationalize this variable. Cox extends
the insights of the comparative literature on the reductive effects of presidential elections on the number of
parties (Shugart and Carey 1992) with a more refined
interval measure of the degree of proximity between
presidential and legislative elections instead of the standard nominal measure of the two elections as concurrent or separate. Proximity is a matter of degree and
ranges from maximal proximity (concurrent elections)
to zero proximity when legislative elections are held at
the presidential midterm. Between these extremes, as
proximity increases presidential elections tend to reduce the number electoral and legislative parties. The
magnitude of this effect depends on the degree of fractionalization of presidential elections as measured by
the effective number of presidential candidates (Cox
1997, 211–13). We, therefore, also examine the interaction of the proximity of presidential and legislative
elections with the effective number of presidential candidates, Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections × Effective Number of Presidential Candidates.
Constructed Ethnopolitical Cleavages: Fragmentation and Concentration. We use two indices to operationalize the two dimensions of constructed ethnopolitical cleavages, fragmentation and concentration. The
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation index is based on
the share of the politicized population that belongs to
each ethnopolitical group or subgroup. Most countries
have different fragmentation scores derived from these
population shares, depending on which of the three levels of inclusiveness is used to calculate the index. For
some countries, these differences will range from very
low to very high fragmentation. A strict application of
constructivist logic might require calculating fragmentation at the level having greatest relevance at the time
of a given election, but that would be almost impossible
to do and would increase the danger of endogeneity by
conflating politicization and particization. Therefore,
we use the index of total fragmentation in our analysis.
This index combines all three levels of inclusiveness by
including all undivided top and middle-level groups and
all lowest-level groups. In other words, total fragmentation includes all groups that are potentially politically
relevant at the national level, while excluding groups
that have not been politicized. We thus relate the greatest possible nationally relevant ethnopolitical fragmentation as identified in our data set to variations in the
structure of the party system, which makes theoretical
sense since parties can appeal to groups at any of the
three levels of inclusiveness.
The Ethnopolitical Group Concentration index is
based on concentration codes adapted from the Minorities at Risk (Phase III) data set: 0 = widely dispersed, 1 = primarily urban or minority in one region,
2 = majority in one region, dispersed in others, and
3 = concentrated in one region (Gurr 1993). The index
for each group is calculated by multiplying its concentration code by its share of the ethnopolitically rele-

384

August 2003

vant population in the country, with the results for all
groups summed to obtain the ethnopolitical group concentration score for the country. Because we wish to examine whether fragmentation and concentration have
independent or joint effects on the number of parties,
we include an interaction term reflecting their product
in the analysis, Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation ×
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration.

Comparison with Other Measures of Ethnic
and Ethnopolitical Cleavages
One of our important claims in this article is that our
measures of ethnopolitical cleavages offer better accounts of the number of electoral and legislative parties
than measures that are not based on our measurement
criteria. To test this claim, we examine the effects of two
such measures. One is the widely used Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization (ELF) Index. Based principally on
data from the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), it assumes
that ethnic groups are primordially fixed, measures ethnic rather than ethnopolitical cleavages, specifies only
one level of cleavage, and does not measure concentration. Our test shows that it has no significant effect
on the structure of party systems in Africa’s emerging
democracies.
The second measure we test is the politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG) index developed by
Posner (2000) in response to the flawed application of
the ELF index by economists to explain the negative
impact of ethnic heterogeneity on economic growth in
Africa. Posner started from the Atlas Narodov Mira
(1964) data to develop a baseline population count (labeled Count C) that includes all ethnic groups listed
in the Atlas. Then he used secondary sources on political competition to eliminate groups that are not relevant to economic policymaking and, in some countries, to disaggregate ethnic groups that are politically
divided or to combine ethnic groups that act together
politically. This method produced a second population
count (Count B) that specifies ethnopolitical groups at
a higher level of aggregation but with less inclusiveness than in Count C. The groups in Count B were
further reduced in number or aggregated to develop
a new population count (Count A). The PREG index
derived from groups specified in Count B comes closest
to approximating the fragmentation index that we have
developed in the sense of including the most ethnopolitical groups; hence we expected it to be more closely
related to the number of electoral and legislative parties
than the previously discussed ELF measure. Our test
shows, however, that its relationship with these outcomes is weakened by it failure to include all ethnopolitical cleavages or geographic concentration.

Case Selection
Our analysis is based on data from 62 elections to the
lower chamber of national legislatures in 34 African
countries that underwent democratic transitions in
the context of the third wave of democratization. In
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focusing on elections as the unit of analysis, we follow Rae (1971) but acknowledge Lijphart’s (1994, 7)
criticism of Rae that “elections under the same rules
are not really independent cases but merely repeated
operations of the same electoral system.” We also examine 15 countries that have held only one election in
conjunction with countries that have held multiple elections, which unduly treats the electoral systems in both
groups as temporally stable. The temporal stability of
electoral system is a key assumption underlying the hypothesized relationship between electoral institutions
and party systems, but there is no “wholly satisfactory
methodology . . . to learn the ‘true’ (stable) number
of parties in a regime that encompasses . . . two or
three elections” (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, 102).
Therefore, while cognizant of these problems in case
selection, we adopt a pragmatic approach of including
the maximum number of cases in our analysis.

Model Specification
We utilize OLS regression to test eight specifications,
four each for Effective Number of Electoral Parties and
Effective Number of Legislative Parties. Model 1 is an
institutional specification that includes variables measuring legislative electoral institutions (District Magnitude) and two aspects of presidential elections, the
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections and
the interaction between the Proximity of Presidential
and Legislative Elections and the Effective Number
of Presidential Candidates. Model 2 is a sociological
specification that tests for the independent effects of
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation and Ethnopolitical Group Concentration as well as their interactive effects (Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation X Ethnopolitical Group Concentration). Model 3 is an additive
specification in which all six variables in the previous
two models are entered in the equation. Model 4 is
an additive/interactive specification and hence a fully
specified model. It includes five variables in Model 3
but replaces the interaction of the two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages in that model with an interaction
term reflecting the product of district magnitude and
the two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages (District
Magnitudes X Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation X
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration).6

RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 display the results of each set of four
specifications for the Effective Number of Electoral
Parties and the Effective Number of Legislative Parties, respectively. For both dependent variables, all four
models are statistically significant and all independent
variables correctly signed and statistically significant.
The purely institutional specification (Model 1) explains 19% of the variance in the number of electoral parties and 24% of the variance in the number
6 See Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990, esp. 40–42, for the motivating
logic for the three-way interaction of independent variables.
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of legislative parties. The purely sociological model
(Model 2), which tests for the independent and interactive effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration, explains 30% of the variance in the number of electoral parties (an increase of 11% over the
institutional model) and 40% of the variance in the
number of legislative parties (an increase of 16% over
the institutional model). In Model 3, the additive effects of electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages account for 40% of the variance in the electoral
party system, increasing the explanatory power of the
additive model by 21% over the institutional model,
and 53% of the variance in the legislative party system,
increasing the explanatory power of the additive model
by 29% over the institutional model. The fully specified
model (Model 4) explains 50% of the variance in the
electoral party system and 52% of the variance in the
legislative party system.
Overall, these results confirm the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in structuring the strategic coordination among voters and candidates and in mediating
the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of
party systems in Africa’s emerging democracies. Examination of the effects of individual clusters of variables provides additional confirmation. Models 2 and
3 confirm the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages
in shaping the structure of party systems, both independently and interactively. Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently reduces the number of electoral
and legislative parties in both models.7 This reductive
effect, which stems from the distinctive morphology
of African ethnopolitical groups that we noted above
and that our data set captures, suggests that increased
number of group cleavages encourages candidates to
forge intergroup alliances to improve on their electoral
gains. Such alliances, while improving the prospect of
group cooperation, also tend to reduce the number
of electoral and legislative parties. Ethnopolitical concentration, however, counteracts this reductive effect
of fragmentation. For example, when group concentration is high, at 2.56, group fragmentation tends to
increase the effective number of electoral parties by .04
and the effective number of legislative parties by .03.
Correspondingly, when group concentration is low at
.63, group fragmentation tends to reduce the effective
number of electoral parties by −.04 and the effective
number of legislative seats by −.02.8 This counteracting
influence of ethnopolitical concentration on ethnopolitical fragmentation remains even with the addition of
institutional variables in Model 3.
These important results can be explained by the
role of group concentration in reducing the transaction costs of forging and sustaining group solidarity.
Scholars of social movements (Tarrow 1994) have
7

We ran a separate equation without the interaction term to confirm
the independent effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation. We do not
report the results to save space.
8 We derived these conditional effects of fragmentation on the number of electoral and legislative parties by calculating the value of one
standard deviation of the concentration index above and below the
mean value of the index and entering these values into an equation
to obtain the additive and multiplicative coefficients.
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TABLE 1.
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Determinants of Effective Number of Electoral Parties

Independent Variables
District Magnitude (logged)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections ×
Effective Number of Presidential Candidates
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation

Model 1
.10
(.52)
−4.50∗∗
(1.41)
1.50∗∗
(.48)

Ethnopolitical Group Concentration
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation ×
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration
District Magnitude × Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation ×
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration
Constant
R2
F
N

3.80∗∗∗
(.95)
.19
3.81∗
62

Model 2

−.07∗∗
(.02)
.17
(.29)
.04∗∗
(.02)

2.48∗∗∗
(.21)
.30
4.50∗∗
62

Model 3
.34
(.53)
−3.25∗
(1.30)
.97∗∗
(.33)
−.06∗
(.03)
.03
(.39)
.04∗
(.02)

3.12∗∗∗
(.74)
.40
3.58∗∗
62

Model 4
−1.62∗∗∗
(.42)
−2.80∗∗
(1.03)
1.02∗∗∗
(.28)
−.03∗∗∗
(.01)
.68∗∗
(.27)

.03∗∗∗
(.00)
3.34∗∗∗
(.75)
.50
14.47∗∗∗
62

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001.

TABLE 2.

Determinants of Effective Number of Legislative Parties

Independent Variables
District Magnitude (Logged)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections ×
Effective Number of Presidential Candidates
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation

Model 1
.17
(.20)
−2.76∗∗∗
(.62)
.89∗∗∗
(.20)

Ethnopolitical Group Concentration
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation ×
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration
District Magnitude × Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation ×
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration
Constant
R2
F
N

2.66∗∗∗
(.48)
.24
8.05∗∗∗
62

Model 2

−.03∗∗
(.01)
.17
(.16)
.02∗∗
(.01)

1.65∗∗∗
(.15)
.40
6.69∗∗∗
62

Model 3
.26
(.17)
−1.98∗∗∗
(.50)
.53∗∗
(.17)
−.03∗∗
(.01)
.09
(.18)
.02∗∗
(.01)

2.09∗∗∗
(.30)
.53
8.30∗∗∗
62

Model 4
−.65∗∗
(.23)
−1.90∗∗∗
(.44)
.58∗∗∗
(.16)
−.01∗
(.00)
.49∗∗
(.19)

.01∗∗∗
(.00)
2.12∗∗∗
(.31)
.52
10.82∗∗∗
62

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001.

found, for instance, that unmediated communication
of ideas, strategies, and resources is crucial for reducing the collective action costs of group cohesion.
The effectiveness of such communication derives from
the face-to-face interaction in small groups that typically constitute the larger social movements as loosely
linked “congeries of social networks” (Tarrow 1994,
22). African ethnopolitical groups are not social movements, but their morphologies are conceptually similar.
As described above, the combinations of cleavages
among and within groups that typically characterize
African ethnopolitical groups diminish the effectiveness of strategic face-to-face interaction in forging
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groups that are sufficiently large and cohesive to sustain political parties of their own. Group concentration, however, helps to overcome this constraint. The
physical proximity engendered by group concentration
facilitates the strategic face-to-face interaction of small
groups, which helps to solidify the otherwise loose links
among the subgroups. The associated affinity of place,
moreover, helps to define the common interests of the
emergent, spatially anchored larger group in electoral
competition with similarly constructed groups. This
process is the key to the interactive effect of ethnopolitical group fragmentation and concentration on increasing the number of electoral and legislative parties in
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Africa’s emerging democracies. And this effect obtains
with or without the effect of electoral institutions.
The variables related to presidential elections consistently demonstrate the substantial effect of the Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections in reducing the number of electoral and legislative parties,
reproducing in Africa the almost-universal tendency
of presidential regimes to constrict the structure of
party systems. But, just as consistently, the interaction
of proximity and the Effective Number of Presidential Candidates counters this effect, indicating, for the
reasons detailed above, the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in shaping strategic entry as well as voter
behavior in presidential elections (Cox 1997, 211).
District magnitude, widely acknowledged as the decisive institutional variable in shaping the structure of
party systems, has no independent effect (Models 1 and
3). This unexpected result may reflect the workings of
weakly institutionalized electoral systems, but it also
indicates the effect of context. The two, of course, are
not mutually exclusive. District magnitude is a hard
constraint to which political actors must strategically
adjust. In emerging democracies, however, political
actors’ limited knowledge and understanding of institutional incentives and the salience of ethnopolitical cleavages as alternative incentive structures vitiate
the expected strategic consequences of district magnitude, but without totally removing its mechanical effects. In other words, candidates and voters in emerging democracies rely on familiar cues of ethnopolitical
affiliations for cost-effective coordination of electoral
strategies, but district magnitude may still mechanically
exert a moderating influence. This is why we test for the
joint effects of institutional and contextual variables
(Models 3 and 4). This test shows that district magnitude does have a significant effect, but only in interactive combination with ethnopolitical cleavages. In
the additive Model 3, for instance, district magnitude
has no independent effect on the number of electoral
and legislative parties. But in the fully specified Model
4, which includes an interaction term measuring the
product of district magnitude and the two ethnopolitical cleavage measures, district magnitude substantially
reduces the number of electoral and legislative parties.9
Large district magnitudes tend to reduce the number of parties if ethnopolitical fragmentation is high
and ethnopolitical concentration is low, as exemplified by South Africa, but they tend to increase the
number of parties if both fragmentation and concentration are high, as exemplified by Benin. In South
Africa, ethnopolitical groups are highly fragmented
(fragmentation index = 7.89) due to substantial cleavages among the nine groups that comprise the majority African population as well as among the Englishspeakers and the Afrikaners that comprise the White
population. They are also spatially dispersed (concen-
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tration index = 1.6).10 However, the continued strategic importance of race as a cost-effective basis of electoral mobilization diminishes the political significance
of intragroup cleavages among African voters, while
White voters typically tend to divide their votes among
several smaller parties. As a result, the average effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties in
South Africa over two elections are 2.2 and 2.2, respectively, even though the average district magnitude is 40
seats and the allocation rule is the highly proportional
Largest-Remainder Droop formula.
In Benin, ethnopolitical groups are only slightly
less fragmented than in South Africa (fragmentation index = 7.30), but they are also more geographically concentrated, principally in the administrative
provinces that form the electoral districts (concentration index = 3.0). Combined with an average district
magnitude of 11 seats and with the highly proportional
Largest-Remainder Hare formula as the allocation
rule, this concentration has fostered correspondingly
fragmented party systems, with the average effective
numbers of electoral and legislative parties at 13.0 and
7.0, respectively.
Finally, even moderate levels of geographical concentration of ethnopolitical groups tends to offset the
expected constraining effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation and small district magnitudes on the number of parties, as exemplified by Kenya and Malawi. In
both countries, seats are allocated by plurality formula
in single member districts. But in Kenya, which has a
fragmentation index of 9.5 and a concentration index
of 2.3, the effective numbers of electoral and legislative
parties are 4.3 and 3.0, respectively. In Malawi, which
has a fragmentation index of 5.8 and a concentration
index of 2.8, the effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties are 2.8 and 2.8, respectively.
The influence of district magnitude on the structure
of party systems in Africa’s emerging democracies thus
reflects a complex pattern of interaction with ethnopolitical cleavages. Large district magnitudes tend to reinforce the reductive effect of highly fragmented and
spatially dispersed ethnopolitical groups on the number of parties. Large district magnitudes tend to reinforce the expansive effect of spatially concentrated
but otherwise fragmented ethnopolitical groups on the
number of parties. And small district magnitudes tend
to reduce the number of parties when ethnopolitical
groups are fragmented but tend to increase them when
ethnopolitical groups are spatially concentrated.

Comparing the Effects of ELF and PREG
Indices
To test if the two alternative measures of ethnic heterogeneity, the ELF and PREG indices, improve on
10

9

We used the Aikaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayes
criterion to determine the superiority of the three-way interaction
among district magnitude, ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical concentration over the two-way interaction between district
magnitude and each of the two ethnopolitical cleavage measures.

The Asians and the Coloreds, the other two ethnopolitical groups
in South Africa, are not internally divided. For comparative reference, the mean, median, and range of the fragmentation indices for
the 34 countries in our data set are 4.38, 3.92, and 1.0–9.91, respectively. The corresponding values for the concentration indices are
1.60, 1.84, and 0.0–3.0, respectively.
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our measures of ethnopolitical cleavages in explaining
variations in the number of electoral and legislative parties in Africa’s emerging democracies, we substituted
them for our measures in the fully specified Model 4,
excluding ethnopolitical concentration because the two
indices do not measure it. The results, not reported
here to save space, show that the two indices have no
significant effect, independently or interactively with
district magnitude. The proximity of presidential and
legislative elections and its interaction with the effective number of presidential candidates wholly account
for the variance in the number of electoral and legislative parties.
The nonsignificance of the ELF index is not surprising. The index measures ethnic heterogeneity by indicators of social cleavages, such as language, but not every
objective indicator of social cleavage possesses intrinsic political salience. Indeed, most conventional ethnographic indicators, including, especially, language and
religion, have not acquired the political salience in contemporary Africa that they have elsewhere (Mozaffar
and Scarritt 1999). The PREG index, which is otherwise premised on constructivist logic, was nonsignificant for two possible reasons. First, the PREG index
was designed to explain the potential impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the lack of economic growth in
Africa, and not on electoral outcomes. Thus the levels
of ethnopolitical cleavage captured by its Counts A or
B may not necessarily be the most relevant ones in
electoral politics. Second, it does not measure ethnopolitical concentration, which in our analysis consistently
counteracts the impact of fragmentation.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our results demonstrate that, in Africa’s emerging
democracies, both electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems,
but not reflexively. They do so contingently and strategically. Our results thus point up the need to replace the
misconstrued institutions-or-cleavages debate in the
comparative literature on party systems with a more
analytically sound theoretical specification that privileges neither institutions nor cleavages but allows for
systematically sorting out their independent and joint
effects. Our results also demonstrate that ethnopolitical cleavage measures based on constructivist specification of ethnopolitical groups improve on explanations
that utilize measures of ethnic heterogeneity based on
primordialist specification. Our results thus underscore
the importance of systematic incorporation of constructivist insights in comparative research agendas.
Finally, our results demonstrate the significance of
both ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical
concentration, the latter heretofore unexamined in comparative scholarship, in influencing the number of
electoral and legislative parties in Africa’s emerging
democracies. In particular, they clarify the complex
ways in which the two cleavage dimensions independently and interactively with each other and with electoral institutions shape the structure of party systems.
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By influencing the effective number of presidential
candidates, ethnopolitical cleavages moderate the reductive effects of the proximity of presidential and
legislative elections on the number of parties, encouraging the formation of electoral alliances between major presidential contenders seeking electoral victory
and minor ones controlling critical blocs of votes that
can secure it. By counteracting the reductive effects of
ethnopolitical fragmentation, moreover, ethnopolitical
concentration helps to increase the number of electoral and legislative parties, expanding opportunities
for electoral competition and political representation.
But district magnitude limits excessive party system
fragmentation due to this expansive effect. It reinforces
the reductive effect of ethnopolitical fragmentation,
enabling geographically concentrated voters voting as a
bloc to increase the number of electoral and legislative
parties. But it interacts with both cleavage dimensions
to offset excessive party system fragmentation.
These complex relationships between electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages have fostered in
Africa’s emerging democracies electoral and legislative
party systems that are characterized by relatively low
levels of fragmentation. For example, the data in Table 3
show that for all 62 elections in 34 countries that we
analyze, the mean values of the effective numbers of
electoral and legislative parties are 3.2 (SD = 2.7) and
2.3 (SD = 1.5) parties, respectively; the corresponding
median values are 2.4 and 2.0 parties, respectively. For
47 multiple elections in 19 countries, the mean values
for effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties
are 3.1 (SD = 2.4) and 2.3 (SD = 1.5) parties, respectively; the corresponding median values are 2.4 and 2.0
respectively. And for 15 single elections in 15 countries,
the average effective numbers of electoral parties and
legislative parties are 3.7 (SD = 3.4) and 2.5 (SD = 1.5)
parties, respectively; the corresponding median values
are 2.5 and 2.2, respectively. This remarkable convergence of Africa’s emerging democracies around some
semblance of party system stability obtains even in the
face of high levels of underlying electoral and legislative
volatility. For example, the data in Table 3 also show
that for the 47 multiple elections (ranging from 2 to 5
elections), the mean electoral volatility index (based on
votes) is 27.87 and the mean legislative volatility index
(based on seats) is 22.96.11 These indices are comparatively lower than those reported for new democracies
in post-World War II western Europe and in southern
Europe in the 1970s but are roughly comparable
to those reported for the new democracies in Latin
America in the 1980s and in the former communist
states in eastern Europe in the 1990s. In all these new
democracies, moreover, high electoral volatility coincides with high party system fragmentation (Bielasiak
2002). That high electoral volatility coincides with
low party system fragmentation in Africa’s emerging
democracies is thus a paradox. Our analysis suggests
three reasons for this paradox.
11 We use Pedersen’s (1983) volatility index, which is calculated by
adding the net percentage change in the votes (or seats) won by each
party from one election to the next and dividing the sum by two.
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TABLE 3. Mean and Median Values of Effective Numbers of Electoral and
Legislative Parties and Indices of Electoral and Legislative Volatility
Effective Number of
Electoral Parties

Effective Number of
Legislative Parties

3.2
(2.7)
2.4

2.3
(1.5)
2.0

3.1
(2.4)
2.4

2.3
(1.5)
2.0

3.7
(3.4)
2.5

2.5
(1.5)
2.2

Number of elections
All elections (N = 62)
Mean
(SD)
Median
Multiple elections (N = 47)
Mean
(SD)
Median
Single elections (N = 15)
Mean
(SD)
Median
Volatility indices for 47 multiple elections
Mean electoral volatility index
Mean legislative volatility index

First, because of the manifest programmatic and organizational weakness of African political parties, candidates rely principally on ethnopolitical group support to win. But, because of intergroup and intragroup
cleavages, few African ethnopolitical groups possess
sufficient numerical strength and internal cohesion to
propel a candidate to victory on their own. Candidates,
therefore, forge ethnopolitical coalitions to secure victory in each election. However, because of the very
morphology that encourages them in the first place,
these election-specific coalitions tend to shift from election to election, increasing electoral volatility. Second,
because characteristic problems of limited information
about new electoral institutions and the extent of electoral support in postauthoritarian democracies vitiate
the constraints of strategic barriers to entry in electoral competition (Cox 1997, 151–72), excessively large
numbers of candidates and parties, most lacking even
minimum levels of electoral support, compete in democratic elections in Africa’s emerging democracies. This
typically results in a highly skewed vote distribution,
with a small number of candidates and parties winning by substantial majorities, in high levels of electoral volatility, in the emergence of a small number of
electoral and legislative parties, and hence in relatively
concentrated party systems. Finally, these two reasons
suggest a curvilinear relationship between ethnopolitical fragmentation and the structure of party systems
in Africa’s emerging democracies. Low fragmentation
correlates in a straightforward way with a small number
of parties and low party system fragmentation. High
fragmentation encourages the formation of intergroup
coalitions that also help to reduce the number of parties
and party system fragmentation. But moderate levels
of fragmentation, combined with the countervailing effect of concentration, increase the number of parties
and party system fragmentation, with district magnitude exerting an additional moderating influence to
diminish the prospect of excessive increases in both.
The complex interaction of electoral institutions and

27.87
22.96

ethnopolitical cleavages thus structures the conversion
of electoral volatility into concentrated party systems
in Africa’s emerging and unconsolidated democracies.
What are the implications of our analysis for the stability of these democracies? We conclude with three
speculative answers. First, both the dominant multiethnic pattern of ethnopolitical cleavages captured by our
data set and the resulting structures of electoral and legislative party systems revealed by our data analysis are
generally conducive for democratic consolidation. The
multiethnic pattern of ethnopolitical cleavages exerts
pressure toward the formation of multiethnic electoral
coalitions that, in turn, engender party systems without
excessive fragmentation. Such party systems facilitate
the formation of multiethnic governing coalitions. Second, to the extent that elections remain the principal legitimate source of forming and changing governments,
increasing information on the effects of electoral institutions and the extent of electoral support engenders a
learning process for both voters and candidates that is
likely to improve the prospect of strategic coordination
among competing ethnopolitical groups over a small
number of winning candidates.12 This will also help to
lower the current high rate of electoral volatility and
the associated cost of forming multiethnic coalitions in
each election.
Finally, our analysis suggests that no intrinsic antipathy exists between ethnopolitical diversity and
democratic stability in Africa or, for that matter, elsewhere. Claims of such antipathy typically posit a reflexive relationship between ethnicity and democracy
that is grossly misconstrued, rests on the fundamentally flawed primordialist conception of ethnicity, and
reflects an odious one-dimensional view of ethnic identities. Our data and analysis show, instead, that clarifying the relationship between ethnicity and democracy requires (a) conceiving ethnicity as a strategic
12

Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002) present a systematic analysis of this
process in Senegal, Mexico, Taiwan, and South Korea.
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resource that is contingently politicized and (b) paying close attention to variations in the configuration of
resulting ethnopolitical cleavages. Democratic stability
is typically threatened when ethnopolitical cleavages
reflect the configuration of deeply divided societies in
which two internally cohesive, sharply polarized, and
spatially mixed groups are implacably arrayed against
each other, as exemplified most brutally in contemporary Africa by Rwanda and Burundi.13 Our data
and analysis reveal, however, that ethnopolitical cleavages in the other 38 African countries manifest a predominantly multiethnic configuration engendered by
the combination of salient intergroup and intragroup
cleavages.14 Within the dominant multiethnic configurations of African countries, therefore, variations in the
incidence and interaction of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration, and in the interaction of these
two cleavage dimensions with electoral institutions, offer partial but crucial insights into, as well as reasons
for cautious optimism about, the relationship between
ethnopolitical diversity and the prospective stability of
Africa’s emerging democracies.
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